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MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT*
FOWLER V. HARPER**
To the men who founded this nation the idea that "a man's house
is his castle" was no mere figure of speech. One of the many just causes
of complaint by the colonists and one largely responsible for the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, was
the practice of British courts to issue the notorious "writs of assistance."
These writs enabled the Kings' customs officers to go ransacking at
large through homes and warehouses on fishing expeditions for contra-
band. Smuggling during colonial days was costing the royal treasury
large sums and the ruthless writ was a catchall device to meet it.
As early as 1886 in Boyd v. United States' Justice Bradley pointed
out the close relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the pro-
vision against self-incrimination of the Fifth. The seizure or compulsory
production of a citizen's private papers to be used against him is the
equivalent of compelling him to be a witness against himself. In the
course of his opinion the Justice took occasion to go into the history of
the Fourth Amendment. He quoted James Otis of Massachusetts that
this writ of assistance was "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the
most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of
law, that ever was found in an English law book." The liberty of the
citizens was placed in "the hands of every petty officer."
The occasion was a court argument in the Boston Town House in
1761 between a representative of the crown on the one hand and Otis
and Oxenbridge Thatcher on the other. An authentic account was pre-
pared by John Adams who was present at the argument.' Otis went on
to point out that "not more than one instance can be found of it in all
our law-books; and that was in the zenith of arbitrary power, viz. in
the reign of Charles 2, when Star-Chamber powers were pushed to
extremity by some ignorant clerk of the Exchequer."3 Adams stated
that the one precedent of issuing general warrants in the time of Charles
2 was by Chief Justice Scroggs, for which he was afterwards impeached
by the House of Commons.'
In view of their bitter experiences with these general writs giving
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officers blanket authority, it is understandable that the framers of the
Bill of Rights took care in the Fourth Amendment to prohibit such out-
rages in the future by the national government. There were not only to
be no "unreasonable searches and seizures" but magistrates were for-
bidden to issue warrants except upon "probable cause" and the warrant
must particularly describe "the place to be searched and the person
or things to be seized." There was to be no more random housebreaking.
Justice Frankfurter in a recent dissenting opinion5 pointed out
that the Fourth Amendment was modeled after the similar provision in
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 which also required probable
cause under oath before a warrant would issue and that the warrant
be "accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects
of search, arrest or seizure." "It is significant," the opinion continued,
that the constitution of every State contains a clause like that
of the Fourth Amendment and often in its precise wording.
Nor are these constitutional provisions historic survivals ....
It tells volumes that in 1938, New York, not content with
statutory protection, put the safeguard into its constitution.
If one thing on this subject can be said with confidence it is
that the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment against
search and seizure by the police, except under the closest
judicial safeguards, is not an outworn bit of Eighteenth Cen-
tury romantic rationalism but an indispensable need for a
democratic society.0
As a general proposition, no search is reasonable unless made
pursuant to the authority of a warrant or as incident to a lawful arrest.
Peace officers may on occasion break and enter a building without a
warrant for the purpose of arresting a suspected felon. If the circum-
stances justify the arrest, documents or other articles thought to be con-
nected with the crime may be seized as incident to the arrest. But the
extent of such a search has been defined only in general and often in-
consistent terms by the Supreme Court. The officer is not limited to
articles in plain sight or on the person of the prisoner but, on the other
hand, he is not authorized to search a house from attic to cellar. The
limits are somewhere between, but a policeman's or lawyer's guess is
about as good as a Supreme Court Justice's.
In the much cited case of United States v. Rabinowitz,7 decided a
year after Rutledge's death, the Court upheld a search and seizure as
"incident" to a lawful arrest under the following circumstances. Federal
officers had sufficient information to constitute "probable cause," that
is reasonable grounds, to think that the accused was engaged in traffic
5. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
6. Id. at 160-61.
7. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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in forged postage stamps. They obtained a warrant for his arrest but
no search warrant was issued. When they arrested him in his place of
business, they searched his desk, safe and file cabinets and seized over
five hundred forged stamps. In finding the search "reasonable," the
Court pointed out a number of factors bearing on the issue. It was "in-
cident" to a lawful arrest, the place searched was not a home but a busi-
ness room to which the public was invited, the room was small and under
the complete control of the person arrested, the search did not extend
beyond the premises used for unlawful purposes, and the possession of
forged stamps itself was a crime just as it is a crime knowingly to possess
burglar's tools or counterfeit money.
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissented sharply. The search,
they thought, was unlawful since it was practical for the officers to have
obtained a search warrant either at the time of the issuance of the war-
rant for arrest or, for that matter, thereafter. This had been the rule
laid down by the Court less than two years before8 and was now over-
ruled. The two Justices pointed to the origin of the exception that a
search may be "reasonable" when made as "incident" to a lawful arrest.
Its basic roots lie in necessity, they declared.
What is necessity? Why is a search of the arrested person
permitted? For two reasons: first, in order to protect the ar-
resting officers and to deprive the prisoner of potential means
of escape, and secondly, to avoid destruction of evidence by
the arrested person. [Citations omitted.] From this it follows
that officers may search and seize not only the things physi-
cally on the person arrested, but those within his immediate
physical control. What a farce it makes of the whole Fourth
Amendment to say that because for many legal purposes every-
thing in a man's house is under his control; therefore, his
house-his rooms-may be searched."
They also pointed out that the lawfulness of the search of a motor
vehicle is likewise "rooted in necessity" because of the impracticability
of securing a warrant. 10
It is clear, however, aside from the extent of the search allowable as
incident to an arrest, that the arresting officer must have an arrest war-
rant or, if it is impracticable to obtain one, he must have "probable
cause" to make the arrest. This means by the common law rule that
the crime must have been committed in his presence or he must have
reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person has committed
a felony. And such cause must exist before the arrest-not afterwards,
as a result of the search. As Justice Jackson remarked: "It will not do
8. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
9. 339 U.S. 56, 72 (1950).
10. Id. at 73.
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for the Government to justify the search by the arrest and the arrest
by the search."'"
And even if officers have "probable cause" for entering and making
an arrest without warrants, they may not force an entry, if the suspect
is in the house, without first giving notice of their authority and purpose
in demanding admission. Justice Brennan recently quoted from an early
seventeenth century English opinion.
In all cases where the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors
be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest
him or to do other execution of the K[ing]'s process, if other-
wise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to
signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open
doors.'2 (Justice Brennan's emphasis.)
The occasion for the reference was a case in which officers had knocked
on the door and when the householder opened it on an attached chain
and asked what they wanted, one of the officers put his hand inside the
door, ripped off the chain and entered. The Supreme Court held the
ensuing search unlawful. An exception to the requirement, of course,
is where it is obvious that the householder knows what the officers are
there for. They are not required to go through a futile ritual.
One of the last cases in which Justice Rutledge participated was
Wolf v. Colorado." His dissenting views here are noteworthy for
several reasons, not the least of which is their complete vindication in
an epoch-making case twelve years after his death. The Wolf case in-
volved the use of illegally obtained evidence in a criminal trial in a
state court. In 1913, the Court had held in Weeks v. United States14
that evidence obtained in violation of the search and seizure provision
of the Fourth Amendment could not be used in a criminal trial in a
federal court. The accused had been convicted of using the mails in
connection with a lottery. The opinion was by Mr. Justice Day, in the
course of which he wrote:
The tendencies of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful seizures
and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after sub-
mitting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive
of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find
no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged
at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which
11. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 (1948).
12. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958).
13. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
14. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the main-
tenance of such fundamental rights.15
It should be noted that Justice Day echoed Justice Bradley in the Boyd
case, by linking "unlawful seizures" (the Fourth Amendment) with
"enforced confessions" (the Fifth), a position which was later to be re-
echoed by Justices Clark and Black in a 1961 case.'
In Wolf, a physician had been convicted of abortion in the state
courts of Colorado. The police had entered his office without a warrant
and without his consent. They obtained from his records the names of
patients who were subsequently used as witnesses against him. The
Court held that there was a distinction between the constitutional pro-
vision against search and seizure and the exclusionary rule of evidence
as applied in Weeks. The former was applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing due process of law; the latter
was not so applicable. The states were free to adopt different rules of
admissibility of evidence.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court as follows:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police-which is the core of the Fourth Amendment-is
basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in "the concept
of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable against the states
through the Due Process Clause. The knock at the door,
whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search, without
authority of law but solely upon the authority of the police,
did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned
as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined
in the history and the basic constitutional documents of Eng-
lish speaking people.
Accordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that were a state
affirmatively to sanction such police intrusion into privacy,
it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourth Amend-
ment. But the ways of enforcing such a basic right raises
questions of a different order.' 7
He then held that the fruits of such an unconstitutional breaking, entry
and seizure may be used in state criminal courts to convict the victim
of such unconstitutional procedure.
Thus, Justice Frankfurter, to quote a figure of speech used by him
in another case,' 8 appeared to have marched the King's men up the hill,
turned them around, and then marched them down again. For purposes
15. Id. at 392.
16. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See discussion in text with note 27 infra.
17. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
18. Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 694 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
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of the practical business of law enforcement, he ended up exactly where
he started. For whatever value it had, he tabulated the states which had
voluntarily followed the Weeks doctrine and those which had not. "As
of today," he wrote, "31 states reject the Weeks doctrine, 16 states are
in agreement with it."19 That was in 1949. In an appendix to his 1960
opinion in Elkins v. United States,2° Justice Stewart listed 28 states
which at that time, as a matter of local law, excluded evidence obtained
in violation of the federal Constitution.
Justices Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge dissented, but Black,
curiously enough, concurred in a short opinion which added little or
nothing to support the Court's decision. Rutledge's notes taken at the
conference indicate Black's first reaction was to reverse Wolf's con-
viction. He later expressed doubt but finally supported the majority.
Justice Murphy pointed out the inadequacy of the common law relief
afforded the victims of police lawlessness. Many states disallow punitive
damages in a tort action for trespass in the absence of malice. "If the
officer searches with care, he can avoid all but nominal damages-a
penny, or a dollar." That an action for damages against an offending
police officer is not effective to protect the citizen's constitutional right
to privacy under the Fourth Amendment has been repeatedly demon-
strated. Murphy also thought that questions of due process of law should
not be determined by taking a poll of the practices in the various states.
Rutledge's dissent was gentle but penetrating.
[Olne should not reject a piecemeal wisdom, merely because it
hobbles toward the truth with backward glances. Accordingly,
although I think that all "the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights should be carried over intact into the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment," [citing Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, dissenting opinion] I welcome the fact that the Court,
in its slower progress toward this goal, today finds the substance
of the Fourth Amendment "to be implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment
...valid as against the states. [He thereupon rejected] the
Court's simultaneous qualification that the mandate embodied in
the Fourth Amendment, although binding on the states, does not
carry with it the one sanction ... failure to observe which means
that "the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . .might as
well be stricken from the Constitution." [Citing Weeks v.
United States.] For I agree with my brother Murphy's demon-
stration that the Amendment without the sanction is a dead
letter.2
For Rutledge, the necessary implication of the Amendment was to forbid
19. Wolf, supra note 17, at 29.
20. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
21. Wolf, supra note 17, at 47.
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the use of evidence so obtained against him "in any criminal proceeding
involving the victim of the unconstitutional search." It was compounding
the original wrong and unworthy of civilized government, whether federal
or state. "Compliance with the Bill of Rights betokens more than lip
service." He believed with Holmes that the use of evidence obtained in
violation of those constitutional mandates "reduces the Fourteenth
Amendment to a form of words. '22
Less than three years later, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
Court in another sensational case, 3 reversed a conviction by the California
courts of an accused charged with selling narcotics. State officers had
entered the home of the suspect and forced their way into the bedroom
occupied by himself and his wife. When they questioned the petitioner
about two capsules lying on a bedside table, he grabbed them, put them
in his mouth and swallowed them. After an attempt to extract the capsules
by force, the police took the petitioner to a hospital where an emetic was
forced into his stomach over his protests. He vomited the two capsules,
which were found to contain morphine, and which were used in evidence
against him.
This was too much for Frankfurter to stomach.
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking
into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth
and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his
stomach's contents-this course of proceedings by agents of
government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened
sensitivities. They are methods too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.24
But the case turned on the Fourteenth Amendment as such, not on the
Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating the Fourth. Justices Black and
Douglas concurred on the basis of the self-incriminating clause of the
Fifth Amendment as incorporated under the Fourteenth. "I think," wrote
Black, "a person is compelled to be a witness against himself not only
when he is compelled to testify, but also when as here, incriminating
evidence is forcibly taken from him by a contrivance of modern science."
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, also found a violation of due
process as such in another California case25 in which police had had a
key made to fit the door of the suspect's house, entered it, and installed
a secret microphone in the bedroom of the accused and his wife. He
did not, however, make any departure from his position in the Wolf
case with respect to Fourth Amendment sanctions. He thought the per-
22. Silverstone Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
23. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
24. Id. at 172.
25. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142 (1954).
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formance of the law enforcement officers here so "repulsive" as to violate
the canons of decency prescribed by "due process." Perhaps as much
as any other case, this case tends to support Justice Black's skepticism
of a principle so general that it permits opposite conclusions by such
eminently wise and humane Justices as Jackson, who wrote for the major-
ity in upholding the conviction, and Frankfurter, eloquent in dissent.
Further confusion was added in 1957 when the Court upheld a
conviction in a criminal case in which evidence of intoxication of a truck
driver was admitted. The police had instructed a physician to take a
blood test by use of a hypodermic needle while the accused was un-
conscious after, a traffic accident. A majority of the Court was able to
distinguish the case from the stomach pumping situation. Chief Justice
Warren, Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
2 6
The complete vindication of Rutledge's Wolf dissent came in 1961,
when on the last day of the term the Court handed down its decision in
Mapp v. Ohio.2 7 Mr. Justice Clark, in reversing the Ohio Supreme Court,
wrote a devastating opinion for the Court, Justices Black and Douglas con-
curring in separate opinions and Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Justices
Frankfurter and Whittaker joined, dissenting.
The facts in Mapp were indeed shocking. Three Cleveland police
officers had information that a suspect, wanted for questioning in con-
nection with a recent bombing, was hiding in a house in which the Mapp
woman lived with a daughter by a former marriage. They also suspected
that some "policy paraphernalia" was concealed there. The officers went
to the house, knocked on the door and demanded entrance. Miss Mapp,
after telephoning her attorney, refused to admit them without a warrant.
Later, a half dozen officers arrived and broke through one of the doors.
When the householder asked for a warrant, an officer waved before her
some kind of paper which she immediately grabbed and concealed in her
bosom. As stated by Justice Clark in his opinion, "[a] struggle ensued in
which the officers recovered the piece of paper and as a result of which
they handcuffed appellant because she had been 'belligerent' in resisting
their official rescue of the 'warrant' from her person." After some futher
"roughing up," Miss Mapp, in handcuffs, was forcibly taken upstairs to
her bedroom where the officers searched a chest of drawers, a closet and
some suitcases. They then went through the rest of the house including the
basement. In the course of this widespread search, they found the mate-
rials for which she was subsequently prosecuted and convicted for having
in her possession. The materials seized had nothing to do with the
"bombing" or the "policy paraphernalia." Miss Mapp was convicted of
having in her possession obscene literature. No valid search warrant
had been issued.
26. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
27. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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In the course of his opinion, Justice Clark again referred to the close
connection between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, which he de-
scribed as running "almost into each other." He reviewed developments
subsequent to Wolf. He then held that the Fourth Amendment right
of privacy was equally enforceable against the states by the same sanction
of exclusion as against the federal government.
"Moreover," continued Clark,
our holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the
logical dictate of prior cases, but it also makes very good sense.
There is no war between the Constitution and common sense.
Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence
illegally seized, but a State's attorney across the street may,
although he supposedly is operating under the enforcement pro-
visions of the same Amendment. Thus the State, by admitting
evidence unlawfully seized, serves to encourage disobedience to
the Federal Constitution which it is bound to uphold ...
In non-exclusionary states, federal officers, being human, were
• .. invited to and did, as our cases indicate, step across the
street to the State's attorney with their unconstitutionally seized
evidence. 8
Inasmuch as Justice Clark had himself been a law enforcement
officer, albeit at the highest level, many lawyers and others were surprised
at his forthright position in connection with search and seizure. But
as Professor Allen has pointed out, although the Justice had from time
to time displayed a sympathetic attitude toward the problems of police
and prosecutors, he was not a member of the Court when the Wolf case
was decided and, in fact, had actually stated his disapproval of the de-
cision in that case. "Clearly, Mr. Justice Clark meant what he said."2 9
Only a year before the Mapp case, the Court in Elkins v. United
States, 80 over the protest of four Justices, outlawed the rule that federal
prosecutors could avail themselves of evidence illegally seized by state
officers operating entirely on their own account. Theretofore, although
federal officers were prohibited from conducting illegal raids and seizures,
the fruits of such lawlesness by state officials could be handed to them "on
a silver platter."
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, admitted an awareness on
its part that the Wolf decision, refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to
state prosecutions, "operated to undermine the logical foundation of the
Weeks case which applied the exclusionary rule to federal prosecutions."
28. Id. at 657.
29. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, in THE
SUPREME CoUar REVIEW, 1, 23 (Kurland ed. 1962).
30. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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To the victim, he said, "it matters not whether his constitutional right
has been invaded by a federal agent or by a state officer."'1  He sum-
marized the considerations of "reason and experience" calling for the re-
jection of evidence illegally seized by state agents and turned over to
federal authorities. "But," he continued, "there is another consideration
-the imperative of judicial integrity," quoting from Holmes, thirty-odd
years before in a wire-tapping case, 32 that "no distinction can be taken
between the Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge."
Justice Stewart also made a pointed argument on the effect of the old
rule on the principle of federalism. By admitting evidence in federal
criminal courts illegally seized by police officers in states which excluded
such evidence, the national Government frustrates state policy "in a par-
ticularly inappropriate and ironic way." It serves to defeat the state's
effort to assure obedience to the federal Constitution.
Five years earlier in 1956, a method was formulated to prevent fed-
eral officials from stepping "across the street" to hand over evidence
which they had illegally seized, to state agents "on a silver platter." This
was accomplished by the use of an injunction against a federal agent which
prohibited him from turning over to state prosecutors evidence which he
had obtained in an invalid search. The order also enjoined him from
testifying in the state court.83 In other words, before 1956, state and
federal agents "cooperated" to their mutual satisfaction in successfully
violating the constitutional rights of citizens suspected of criminal offenses.
Nevertheless, a number of states had still accepted such evidence
obtained by their own officers. The New York Constitution, as Justice
Frankfurter has pointed out, contains a provision identical with the
Fourth Amendment and a statute repeats the same language. Apparently
the people wanted to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects." But New York courts, until Mapp, rejected the exclusionary
rule. In a case in which a plain clothes man obtained a key to a hotel
room from the clerk and, without a warrant, conducted a search, a judge
at Special Sessions complained indignantly: "The case at bar is merely
a mild example of how the liberties of New Yorkers are destroyed by the
police and the courts. The rule of evidence -subordinates the courts to
the lawlessness of the police.""4
Mr. Justice Black, in his concurring opinion in the Mapp case, relied
heavily on the Boyd case, wherein the Court decreed that it was unable
to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used
in evidence against him was substantially different from compelling him
to be a witness against himself. He had not accepted this doctrine in
31. Id. at 214-15.
32. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
33. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
34. People v. Reilly, 200 Misc. 1086, 1089, 105 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1951).
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Wolf, in which he wrote a brief concurring opinion. He did, however,
in Mapp. "It was upon this ground," he wrote,
that Mr. Justice Rutledge largely relied in his dissenting opinion
in the Wolf case and, although I rejected the argument at that
time, its force has for me, at least, become compelling with the
more thorough understanding of the problem brought on by
recent cases.8 5
He then referred to the two California cases discussed earlier and pointed
out the confusion which had resulted therefrom. "Finally today we clear
up that uncertain period."
In his lengthy Mapp dissent, Justice Harlan, with whom Justices
Frankfurter and Whittaker concurred, relied upon "judicial restraint"
and stare decisis. He concluded with the ominous statement that "our
voice becomes only a voice of power, not of reason." Justice Douglas,
concurring with the majority, declared that in his opinion, the Wolf case,
supporting a double standard for law enforcement officers, could hardly
be called the voice of reason. It led to "working arrangements" between
federal and state authorities and, in many ways, reduced the administra-
tion of justice to "shabby business."
Associate Justice Roger Traynor of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia has discussed some of the problems created for the fifty states
by the Mapp decision. Justice Traynor himself had undergone a change
of view as to the conflicting policies involved in the issue. He had written
the opinion for his court in 1942 rejecting the exclusionary rule as a
matter of state law. 6 After the Wolf case held that states were free to
accept or reject it as a rule of evidence, the California Law Review com-
mented adversely:
The decision makes it plain that the federal law of search and
seizure is not to be applied to the states in its entirety but is to
be classified into (1) constitutional rules and (2) federal rules
of "procedure" or "evidence" such as the exclusionary rule.
Only the constitutional rules bind the states. However, if the
exclusionary rule is the only effective means of enforcing the
guarantee, the Court has proclaimed an illusory right.3 7
The article then examined the situation in California and concluded that
"it seems clear that present protection is insufficient to secure respect
for the right." In 1955, after what Justice Traynor called his "education
in the biokinetics of law enforcement agencies," he wrote an opinion for
his court which reversed the earlier case, and established the rule in
35. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961) (concurring opinion).
36. People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942).
37. Comment, Wolf v. Colorado and Unreasonable Search and Seizure in California,
38 CALiF. L. REv. 498 (1950).
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California that evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights of
the accused may not be used against him.8" In his opinion excluding the
tainted evidence, the judge explained:
We have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other
remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the
constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the
attendant result the courts under the old rule have been con-
stantly required to participate in, and, in effect condone the
lawless activities of law enforcement officers.8 9
Traynor further explained his thinking: Excluding vital evidence
of guilt would mean, in Judge Cardozo's words, that "the criminal is to
go free because the constable has blundered."4 ° But as illegally obtained
evidence was offered by enforcement authorities in case after case, almost
as a routine procedure, Traynor's misgivings grew. "It was," he wrote
in a 1962 article,
one thing to condone an occasional constable's blunder, to accept
his illegally obtained evidence so that the guilty would not go
free. It was quite another to condone a steady course of illegal
police procedures that deliberately and flagrantly violated the
Constitution of the United States as well as the state Consti-
tution.4
Under the rule of Mapp, as Justice Clark conceded, "The criminal goes
free, if he must." He then added pointedly, "but it is the law that sets
him free." Under the non-exclusionary rule, the criminal goes to prison,
but it is the lawlessness of the police that sends him there.
There is no doubt, however, that in striking at the nasty problem
of police lawlessness in various states, the Supreme Court has created
other problems. Justice Traynor has summed up some of them.
There is no bill of particulars as to what constitutes lawful
arrest or reasonable search incident to lawful arrest. Silence
rings the large question of how much sweep there can be to a
search. We will have to find out what constitutes probable cause
for arrest and probable cause for a warrant. We will have to
find out what it is that makes a search or seizure unreasonable.
And now that the erstwhile rule of evidence is transfigured as
constitutional doctrine, now that it has emerged from the
wings to the mise en scMne of the Fourth Amendment, what will
become of its unsettled relations with the Fifth Amendment,
which has not yet so bodly advanced as the Fourth from the
wings of the Fourteenth Amendment? To call but a partial roll
38. People v. Cahn, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
39. Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 911-12.
40. People v. Defoe, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
41. Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319, 322.
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of the myriad questions is to seize how spare is the rule of Mapp
and to understand how wide must be our search for the clues to
its orderly evolution. We will come upon enduring answers
only if we first come to some understanding of the nature and
scope of the right to privacy that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects. Such understanding will take time, but it is not impossible
to achieve. 2
One of the most serious issues raised by the Mapp decision is that
of retroactivity. Will it "open wide the prison gates?" There are hundreds,
yes, thousands of inmates of prisons throughout the states whose con-
victions were brought about by unconstitutionally obtained evidence, or
at least against whom illegally obtained evidence was admitted. Most,
no doubt, are guilty. Some undoubtedly would have been convicted by
properly admissible evidence. In many situations it would be impossible
to establish the "unreasonable" character of the "search and seizure" if
for no other reason than because the record will fail to disclose the
necessary facts. Defense counsel could well have thought it futile to
raise the point under the prevailing rule of admissibility.
Nevertheless, there is a serious matter here. Are these prisoners,
at whose trials evidence obtained by violation of the law of the land was
used, now unconstitutionally detained?43 The California Supreme Court,
after reversing itself, did indeed apply its rule retroactively to cases which
had been tried before the decision but with appeals still pending. How-
ever, it declined to open the Pandora's Box for prisoners of longer stand-
ing. This distinction was legally feasible since at the time the only change
in the California law was one of procedure. Mapp had not yet been de-
cided. Although prisoners had been erroneously convicted because the
judge made a mistaken ruling on a question of the law of evidence, the
convictions were not void and thus subject to collateral attack, years
thereafter. The situation now is quite different. Prisoners were not only
convicted erroneously, but perhaps, unconstitutionally. It is a plausible
argument that their convictions were void and that they are unconstitu-
tionally imprisoned.
The New York Court of Appeals has also applied the Mapp rule
retroactively to appeals pending at the time of the decision.44 When it
is so retroactively applied, no insoluble questions arise as to the "un-
reasonableness" of the search. If the record does not disclose sufficient
facts for the appellate court to pass final judgment, the case can be
remanded to the lower court and retried. This is what happened in the
New York case. The record which reached the highest New York Court
indicated that the search was unconstitutional unless there was "probable
42. Id. at 320.
43. See Redlich, Constitutional Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1417 (1961).
44. People v. Lorice, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
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cause" to believe that criminal activities were occurring on the premises
searched. "Of course," the court said,
when this case was tried, the People were not required to prove
that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant ...
It may well be that at the time of the entry the officers had
probable cause which would have justified their making an
arrest.48
The Supreme Court of New Jersey handled a similar case in the same
way.46
Pre-Mapp convictions with an appeal still pending thus presented
only a relatively small number of cases. Retroactive application to cases
in which final judgments have been rendered, perhaps many years before,
is quite a different matter. 47 In 1956, the Supreme Court held that in-
digent persons convicted in state courts are constitutionally entitled to
a transcript of the record furnished by the state to enable them to appeal
to a higher court if such appeals are available under state law. The Four-
teenth Amendment required as much. Two years later the Supreme Court
applied the rule to the case of a prisoner who had been convicted of
murder in the state courts of Washington some twenty-odd years before.
He was indigent and had requested a free copy of the transcript of the
record at his trial to enable him to appeal. It was denied. The Court
held this to be a denial of his constitutional rights.4
But the situation here is somewhat different and may be distin-
guished. Again to quote Justice Traynor of the California court,
[U]nlike the denial of the right to counsel, the knowing use of
perjured testimony or suppression of evidence, the use of an
involuntary confession, or ... the denial of an opportunity to
present a defense, the use of illegally seized evidence carries
with it no risk of convicting an innocent person. The purpose
of the exclusionary rule is not to prevent the conviction of the
innocent, but to deter unconstitutional methods of law enforce-
ment.49
Several state cases have declined to apply the Mapp rule retroactively as
to cases in which final decisions had been rendered prior to Mapp and the
issue of the validity of the search had not been raised in the original pro-
ceedings.5" On the other hand, a federal Court of Appeals has held that
45. Id. at 374, 179 N.E.2d at 482, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
46. State v. Valentin, 36 N.J. 41, 174 A.2d 585 (1961).
47. For further discussion, see Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Con-
stitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 650 (1962).
48. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
49. In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 883, 336 P.2d 305, 308, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 892 (1961).
50. State v. Kaiser, 193 A.2d 270 (N.J. 1963); Petition of Dirring, 183 N.E.2d 300
(Mass. 1962).
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where the prisoner in his pre-Mapp trial did raise the issue, the Mapp
rule could not be the basis for attacking the decision because of the
doctrine of res judicata, i.e., the matter has been decided." Obviously this
is an unsatisfactory state of affairs which the Supreme Court must soon
clear up.
Another matter to be settled arises with respect to the phrase
"persons, houses, papers, and effects." Just what is included? In Lanza
v. New York,52 the Supreme Court purported to hold that "house" may
include a business office, store, hotel room, apartment, automobile or
occupied taxicab but not a public jail or cell or room therein. In that
case a man named Lanza was convicted of contempt for refusing to answer
questions put to him by a state legislative committee. He claimed im-
munity from punishment because the basis for questions asked him was
a transcript of an electronically intercepted conversation between him
and his brother in a room in a jail where the latter was imprisoned at the
time. The talk had been recorded surreptitiously by state officials and a
copy thereof turned over to the committee. Justice Stewart, writing
for the Court, declared: "For the reasons which follow, we hold that this
constitutional claim is not valid, and we accordingly affirm the judgment
before us." Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the decision
while the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
The "reasons which follow" were set forth briefly. First, the opinion
conceded "as well settled that the fourteenth amendment gives to the
people like protection against the conduct of the officials of any state"
as the fourth gives against officials of the federal government. It also
declared that "there can be no doubt that secret electronic eavesdropping"
under certain circumstances, may amount to an unreasonable search and
seizure. But the notion that a jail is the equivalent of a man's "house,"
the Court thought, was "at best a novel argument." In any event, the
Court declared that "to hold that the petitioner could not constitutionally
be convicted for refusing to answer such [pertinent] questions simply
because they related to a conversation which had been unlawfully over-
heard by other state officials would ...be a completely unprecedented
step.' 5
Curiously enough, the opinion then proceeds to declare that the "ulti-
mate disposition of this case, however, does not demand consideration of
whether such a step might ever be constitutionally required" because two
of the questions asked and to which answers were refused were in no
way related to the intercepted conversation. There was thus an adequate
ground for affirming the state court which in no way involved a federal
issue under the Constitution.
51. Gaitan v. United States, 295 F.2d 277 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962).
52. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
53. Id. at 145.
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But the Court's long practice has been, as Justice Frankfurter has
put it, to decide constitutional questions "last" and not at all, if there
are other adequate grounds for decision. The departure into this "exercise
in futility" drew strong objections from the dissenters. Justice Brennan
expressed his views as follows:
I must protest the Court's gratuitous exposition of several grave
constitutional issues confessedly not before us for decision in the
case. The tenor of the Court's wholly unnecessary comments is
sufficiently ominous to justify the strongest emphasis that of the
abbreviated Court of seven who participate in the decision,
fewer than five will even intimate views that the constitutional
protections aganst invasions of privacy do not operate for
the benefit of persons-whether inmates or visitors-inside a
jail, or that the petitioner lacks standing to challenge secret
electronic interception of his conversations because he has not a
sufficient possessory interest in the premises, or that the Fourth
Amendment cannot be applied to protect against testimonial
compulsion imposed solely as a result of an unconstitutional
search or seizure.5 4
In this "brief" sentence, Justice Brennan was far more sharply crit-
ical of his brother Stewart for unnecessarily discussing constitutional
issues than was Justice Black in an earlier case which attracted consid-
erable journalistic attention.5 5 However, not a line of news print or
editorial comment has been found on Brennan's opinion. Perhaps it is
no longer news that Supreme Court Justices are not only justified but are
obligated to point up what they regard as error in their colleagues' opin-
ions. As the Chief Justice set forth in his memorandum opinion in the
Lanza case, "these expressions of dicta are in a form which can only lead
to misunderstanding and confusion in future cases." He went on to say
that such dicta, "when written into our decisions, have an unfortunate
way of turning up in digests and decisions of lower courts . . . . M As
if to underscore what the Chief Justice thus wrote, headnote 3 in the
Supreme Court Reporter, reporting the case under the West Publishing
Company's key number-"Searches and Seizures, Key 7(10) "-is as
follows: "Public jail is not equivalent of a 'house,' within Fourth Amend-
ment protection, or place where he can claim constitutional immunity
from search or seizure of his person, papers, or effects. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4."57
The lawyer or judge in a hurried search for authority could plau-
sibly conclude from this that the Court had held the Fourth Amendment
did not protect a prisoner in jail against eavesdropping. If he should so
54. Id. at 150.
55. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
56. Note 52 supra at 148.
57. Lanza v. New York, 82 Sup. Ct. 1218 (1962).
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cite the case in his brief or opinion, he would be in error; if he were suffi-
ciently careful to read the opinion, he would be disappointed and exasper-
ated at the waste of his time.
It would appear that Justice Harlan, who was one of the majority of
four, also recognized as mere dicta the entire constitutional discussion
and wanted to make sure that his vote would not be misunderstood. It
will be remembered that he was a dissenter in the Mapp case. He did
not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment afforded the same protection
against state governments as the Fourth does against the national govern-
ment. This he reiterated in Lanza. Thus, his concurring opinion:
I do not understand anything in the Court's opinion to suggest
either that the fourteenth amendment "incorporates" the pro-
visions of the fourth, or that the "liberty" assured by the four-
teenth amendment is, with respect to "privacy," necessarily
coextensive with the protections afforded by the fourth. On that
premise, I join the Court's opinion.58
The actual decision in the Mapp case is with respect to evidence
obtained by a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreason-
able search and seizure. What are its implications for the use of evidence
obtained illegally but not unconstitutionally? Evidence obtained by wire-
tapping presents such a case. Wire-tapping is not unconstitutional, 0
but it is forbidden by an Act of Congress. Evidence obtained thereby,
either by state or federal officers, may not be used in criminal trials in the
federal courts,60 but the Court held in 1952 that it could be admitted in
state criminal trials if it was admissible under state rules of evidence.
It has been suggested that the Mapp case may indicate the end of this
practice as well, not because the constitutional rights of the accused have
been violated but because Congress has extended to him this statutory
protection which, under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, should
prevail over state law.6l
Although most commentators approve the adoption of the exclusion-
ary rule, in all fairness, it should be noted that the opposite view has
had its champions, on the merits, among the greatest of legal scholars.
There were some who considered the doctrine of the Weeks case "heret-
ical" and "sentimental." "'The doctrine of Weeks v. United States,'"
noted Professor Wigmore in his great work on Evidence,
"also exemplifies a trait of our Anglo-American judiciary pecu-
liar to the mechanical and unnatural type of justice. The
natural way to do justice here would be to enforce the healthy
58. 370 U.S. 139, 147 (1962).
59. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
60. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
61. See Redlich, supra note 43, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1417, 1424-25 (1961).
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principle of the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e., by sending
for the high-handed, over-zealous marshal who had searched
without a warrant, imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for his
contempt of the Constitution, and then proceeding to affirm the
sentence of the convicted criminal. But the proposed indirect
and unnatural method is as follows:"
Wigmore then ironically described the exclusionary rule in his classic
words to Titus and Flavius, quoted by Justice Stewart in his "silver
platter" opinion:
"Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery;
Flavius, you have confessedly violated the Constitution. Titus
ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for con-
tempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not
punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus'
conviction. This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to
behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave, and inci-
dentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of
upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who
breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something
else." 2
Just as it is generally thought that the admission of illegally seized
evidence encourages lawlessness on the part of police, it is also assumed
that the exclusionary rule tends to deter, although the empirical evidence
is inconclusive on the latter point.6 3 Indeed, it is not conclusive on either
point but such evidence as there is certainly supports the first proposition.
An extended study of police behavior in Philadelphia when evidence
obtained by unconstitutional means was admissible in state criminal trials
revealed a wide gap between the law of arrest and search on the one hand
and police practice on the other. After presentation of various patterns
of police action and specific cases of law violation, two conclusions
emerged: "(1) the police in Philadelphia are in many cases arresting
without sufficient information, and (2) even when they do have the infor-
mation required by law for a legal arrest, it has often been gained by
illegal means, notably the illegal search." It was further observed by the
investigators:
The amount of illegality discovered is perhaps startling in view
of the facts that chiefly formal arrests were studied, which
generally are far more commendable than the informal types,
and that the bulk of information gathered was derived from
police sources, which probably present police practice in its most
favorable light.
64
62. 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2184a, n.1 (McNaughton ed. rev. 1961).
63. Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig: Ten Years Later, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083 (1959).
64. Comment, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L.
REv. 1182, 1206-07 (1952).
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This study was financed by an annual grant for studies in Law Enforce-
ment and Individual Liberty, provided by Jacob Kossman of the Phila-
delphia Bar, in memory of Justice Rutledge.65
Perhaps Justice Traynor's observations,66 as an appellate judge with
many years experience, are enough to convince most persons that police
lawlessness was greatly encouraged by the non-exclusionary rule. Justice
Jackson's remarks in a recent case67 tend to confirm Traynor's experience.
"Only occasional and more flagrant abuses," he wrote,
come to the attention of the courts, and then only those where
the search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and the de-
fendant is at least sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If
the officers raid a home, an office, or stop and search an automo-
bile but find nothing incriminating, this invasion of the personal
liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical redress. There
may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful
searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn
up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about
which courts know nothing, and about which we never hear.
As pointed out by Barth,68 the victims are frequently in no position to
make resistance. They usually are poor and ignorant, sometimes without
counsel. If they do complain it is unlikely to carry much weight. "Trial
courts are often not disposed to scrutinize police methods with much
severity so long as they are persuaded of a defendant's guilt." They are
unwilling to let the criminal go free merely "because the constable
blundered."
Many state officials and some others are apprehensive of the effects
of the exclusionary rule on law enforcement. They fear that the police
will be handicapped. And so they will. They are now required to act
within constitutional limits or their efforts will be altogether futile. How-
ever, the arguments as to the actual effects of the exclusionary rule have
probably been exaggerated. Professor Allen has summed it up in a
thoughtful article, as follows:
That the Mapp decision will produce both immediate and long-
range consequences of considerable importance seems very
likely. An effort to catalogue all the possible results of the case
would constitute a highly speculative enterprise indeed. One
statement can be made with reasonable confidence, however:
The decision in Mapp does not spell disaster for American law
enforcement at the state and local levels. Nothing in previous
65. See also Note, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Constitutional
Right to Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 493, 497 (1952).
66. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
67. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
68. BARTr, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY, 109 (1960).
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experience suggests that the presence or absence of the exclu-
sionary rule is the factor crucial to the effectiveness of the crim-
inal law.69
He might have added that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other
agents of the national government have lived with the exclusionary
rule for fifty years without noticeable impairment of their effectiveness.
Here, as in other problems of democracy, there is no doubt that
what is needed is a more efficient and effective education in the principles
under which this Nation was brought into being and under which it will
survive only if it adheres thereto. Unfortunately, the evidence accumu-
lates that the American people are losing contact with their beginnings.
In an address before the American Bar Association in Chicago
recently, Justice Brennan referred to the apparent failure of many
Americans, especially the young generation, to understand the value and
importance of their constitutional liberties. He referred to a recent study
made at Purdue University of high school students. More than a third
of those polled, for example, did not object to third degree methods
used by police. The Justice believed that public understanding is essen-
tial to assure official observance of individual rights. "As the power of
Government expands," he is reported to have said, "so the opportunities
for official abuse of that power multiply. If those who wield the power
are not sensitive to the guarantees of individual liberty, the likelihood
of official lawlessness cannot help but increase70
69. Allen, Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, in TEa
SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 1, 40 (Kurland ed. 1962).
70. New York Times, Tuesday, Aug. 13th, 1963.
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